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Most emerging markets do not borrow much 
internationally in their own currency, although 
doing that has been argued as an attractive insurance 
mechanism. This phenomenon, commonly labeled “the 
original sin”, has mostly been interpreted as evidence of 
the countries’ inability to borrow in domestic currency 
from abroad. This paper provides a novel explanation 
for that phenomenon: not that countries are unable to 
borrow abroad in their currency, they might not need 
to do so. In the model, the small prevalence of external 
borrowing in domestic currency arises as an equilibrium 
outcome, despite the absence of exogenous frictions or 
limits on market participation. The equilibrium outcome 
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is driven by the fact that domestic and foreign lenders 
have differential consumption baskets. In particular, a 
large part of domestic lenders’ consumption basket is 
denominated in domestic currency whereas all of foreign 
lenders' is in dollars. A depreciation of domestic currency, 
which tends to occur in bad times, is therefore less 
harmful to domestic savers than to foreign investors. This 
makes domestic lenders require a lower premium than 
foreign lenders on domestic currency debt. For plausible 
calibrations, this consumption basket effect can induce 
foreign investors to pull out of the domestic currency 
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11 Introduction
Most developing countries do not borrow much internationally in their local currencies
(Lane and Shambaugh 2010). Out of 93 low and middle income countries in Lane and
Shambaugh’s dataset, an overwhelming majority have 0% of their foreign debt liabilities
denominated in domestic currencies. Only 4 of them have more than 1%: South Africa
(6.5%), Uruguay (2.5%), Thailand (1.8%) and Slovak Republic (1.4%). This may seem
puzzling because local currency borrowing is generally seen as a good hedging strategy
for a small open economy. In bad times, local currencies usually depreciate, which
beneﬁts issuers of local currency bonds who pay back less in real terms. As local
currency bonds pay less in bad times and pay more in good times, local currency debt
provides insurance against domestic income risk to borrowers. In practice however, we
observe very little international borrowing in local currencies. This lack of external
local currency borrowing is a longstanding puzzle in international ﬁnance and has
mostly been interpreted as evidence of developing and emerging countries’ inability to
borrow internationally in their own currency (Eichengreen and Panizza 2005).
This paper contributes to the literature by oﬀering a new explanation for this
phenomenon. It argues that countries may not need to borrow abroad in their domestic
currencies (e.g. pesos). More precisely, local savers-lenders might be able to lend to
domestic ﬁrms in pesos at a lower premium than foreigners can. Local workers-savers
might accept a lower currency premium on peso bonds because a large part of their
consumption basket is denominated in pesos. In a downturn, the lower return on peso-
bonds can be less harmful to local workers-savers than to foreign lenders because the
former spend a signiﬁcant part of their current expenditures on non-tradable goods
and services in pesos, while the latter have a consumption basket consisting of dollar-
denominated goods only. This largely peso-denominated basket can eﬀectively reduce
the premium demanded by local savers on peso debt, and in particular can bring this
premium down to a level where foreign investors might be pushed out of the peso-bond
market. The marginal prevalence of external peso borrowing is thus not the outcome
of an exogenously imposed ﬁnancial friction or limit on market participation, but it
rather arises endogenously as an equilibrium outcome.
Our model predicts that the relative willingness of local vs. foreign lenders to
hold peso-bonds depends on the degree of synchronization (i.e. correlation) between a
country’s business cycle and the global economic conditions. If foreign lenders’ income
from other sources is orthogonal to the developing country’s business cycle, foreign
2lenders do not require a high premium for holding peso-bonds, thereby pushing local
savers, whose income necessarily co-varies with the domestic business cycle, out of the
market. Foreign lenders in this case, by lending in pesos, eﬀectively act as an insurer
to the small country. This is precisely the rationale of the existing literature on why
small countries should borrow in their domestic currencies. On the other hand, when
foreign lenders’ income is more positively correlated to the small economy’s country
risk, foreign lenders’ incentive to hold peso-bonds declines. And if the “consumption
basket” eﬀect is large enough, domestic lenders are more willing to hold peso bonds
than foreign lenders.
Besides oﬀering a theory of the currency composition of external borrowing, the pa-
per also sheds light on the determinants of currency choice in domestic credit markets.
In line with the earlier work of Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), our model emphasizes the
relative importance of nominal v.s. real shocks in explaining the extent of domestic ﬁ-
nancial dollarization. With the presence of real (i.e. productivity) shocks, equilibrium
peso-lending arises endogenously in our environment because it enables risk sharing
between highly exposed entrepreneurs and relatively less exposed worker-savers. The
basic mechanism is as follows: suppose there is a negative shock to the productivity
of the country’s tradable sector. The tradable good becomes more scarce, and the
non-tradable good becomes relatively abundant. Since the international (dollar) price
of the tradable good is given, this implies a depreciation of the peso. As the same
time, entrepreneurs, as residual claimants, absorb much of the loss and are relatively
worse oﬀ than workers-savers. Since peso bonds pay less due to the depreciation, peso
lending from workers-savers serves as a form of insurance from workers-savers, who
are less exposed to the real shocks, to entrepreneurs, who are more so. Note that
we assume nominal price stickiness in the non-tradable sector.1 The role of nominal
rigidity is important here, because otherwise in a perfectly competitive and ﬂexible
price environment, the impact of the shocks would be proportionately shared between
entrepreneurs and workers, and they would be similarly exposed to shocks. This would
eliminate the role of peso-lending as an insurance instrument, and lead to a counter-
factual result that domestic lending is mostly in dollars.
The impact of nominal shocks on income and consumption, on the other hand, is
small, relative to the impact on peso bonds’ return. This implies a small amount of
peso lending is suﬃcient to hedge against the nominal shock. This limits the need for
1This assumption is broadly consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of
Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005).
3peso lending as an insurance mechanism. Our model thus predicts a higher prevalence
of domestic lending in pesos when real shocks are the dominant source of uncertainty,
but a higher share of ﬁnancial dollarization in environments with larger nominal risks,
consistently with the empirical evidence presented in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003).
The literature oﬀers three main explanations why countries borrow in dollars. The
ﬁrst is the moral hazard hypothesis. Krugman (1998) and Schneider and Tornell (2004)
show that private agents take on risky forms of ﬁnance such as dollar debt to take ad-
vantage of bailout guarantees. However, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) argue that
this cannot satisfactorily explain the high level of dollar debt that could be observed
in ﬁrms that were unlikely to be bailed out. The second line of explanation is the
“original sin” hypothesis, by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and their subsequent
papers. They argue that markets for emerging market local currency debt do not exist
because lenders are afraid that the borrowers will manipulate the exchange rate. Hence
any ex-ante risk premium is potentially insuﬃcient if the exchange rate depreciation
is large enough. Related to this, Jeanne (2003) suggests that the “original sin” is the
result of a lack of credibility in domestic monetary policy that makes borrowers unsure
about the real value of their domestic currency debt and decide to dollarize their liabil-
ities instead. The third line of explanation is due to Korinek (2009), who argues that
ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects create an externality that induces individual borrowers to
undervalue the social risks of dollar debt and take on too much of it.
In relation to the literature, our explanation does not rely on any particular friction.
It rests on the insight that domestic agents’ consumption basket, which is comprised
in large part of non-tradable goods, is more favorable than foreign lenders’s in terms
of peso risk. Hence, domestic lenders can aﬀord a lower risk premium of peso bonds.
Unlike the existing literature that tends to treat a developing country as a single
borrowing agent, we examine separately the problem of domestic borrowers (usually
ﬁrms) and that of domestic lenders. Doing this helps us identify diﬀerential con-
sumption baskets as another factor that works toward explaining heavy dollarization
in international debt markets. We describe in detail the mechanism in a framework
of a DSGE model. The model features three agents (domestic workers-savers, en-
trepreneurs, foreign lenders), two sectors (tradable and non-tradable goods) with sticky
prices and wages and endogenous debt currency choices. All agents can borrow and
lend in the domestic currency (i.e. the peso) or in a foreign currency (i.e. the dollar).
We extend the new solution method developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2010)
4and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) to solve for the long run currency choice of work-
ers, entrepreneurs and foreign lenders in a three-agent, two-asset DSGE setup with
incomplete markets.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the solution of the model. Section 4 analyzes a special case when international borrow-
ing is entirely in dollars. Section 5 analyzes the full-ﬂedged model. And ﬁnally section
6 concludes.
2 The model
The framework: In this section we describe a model with a small economy and a set
of foreign lenders. Foreign lenders are risk averse, and can choose between dollar and
peso bonds. The small economy is populated by a continuum of workers-savers and
a continuum of entrepreneurs. Both types of agents consume two goods: a good that
can be exchanged with the rest of the world (a tradable good) and a good whose
consumption is enjoyed by domestic agents only (a non-tradable good). Both the
tradable sector and the non-tradable sector employ labor and make use of a non-traded
ﬁxed factor (i.e. capital or land) owned by entrepreneurs. Agents can transfer wealth
across periods using money, domestic currency bonds (i.e. peso bonds) and foreign
currency bonds (i.e. dollar bonds). The environment features nominal rigidities in
the labor market and in the non-tradable goods market while tradable goods’ nominal
prices are ﬂexible2. We also assume that the law of one price holds, thus the real price
(i.e. dollar price) of the tradable good is driven by its international price. As a standard
convention in New Keynesian models, nominal rigidities in the non-tradable sector
are modeled by dividing the sector into monopolistic intermediate good producers
and competitive retailers. We would like to analyze a situation in which workers-
savers lend to the entrepreneur sector of the economy, yet we refrain from modeling
capital accumulation for tractability reasons. Thus we essentially assume capital is
ﬁxed. In order to induce the desired pattern of credit in the economy, we assume that
entrepreneurs discount the future more strongly than workers. As a result, relatively
impatient entrepreneurs borrow from relatively patient workers in equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs carry out production in both tradable and non-
tradable sectors. To model nominal rigidities in the non-tradable market, we separate
2Throughout this paper, nominal prices refer to prices in pesos, and real prices refer to prices in
dollars
5the non-tradable sector into intermediate good producers (entrepreneurs) and retail-










where α is the share of capital in intermediate non-tradable goods production. The
labor input LN
jt is purchased from a competitive employment agency and represents an
aggregate of diﬀerentiated labor supplied by workers. Entrepreneurs sell their output
to competitive retailers who combine these intermediate goods to produce ﬁnal goods











where ω is the elasticity of substitution between any two diﬀerentiated intermediate
non-tradable goods.
Besides carrying out non-tradable intermediate production, entrepreneurs also run
tradable goods production. Entrepreneur j hires aggregated labor LT
jt to produce a











where η is the share of capital in tradable goods production.
Entrepreneurs, who act as monopolistically competitive suppliers on the interme-
diate non-tradable goods market, set the price of their good one period in advance
and commit to supply retailers at this price. In period t, entrepreneurs’ production
decisions consist of setting the price of their non-tradable intermediate good PNjt+1
and choosing how much labor LT
jt to hire for tradable good production. In addition,
entrepreneurs also choose tradable consumption cT
Ejt, non-tradable consumption cN
Ejt,
real dollar bond holdings fEjt, nominal peso bond holdings BEjt and money holding














Entrepreneurs maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility function, which in-
cludes aggregate consumption cEjt and real cash holdings
MEjt
Pt ( Pt is the nominal







￿1−γ is a CES





endogenous discount factor that depends on the aggregate (economy-wide) level of
entrepreneurs’ consumption. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), this is a simple
technical device to induce uniqueness of the deterministic steady state and stationary
responses to temporary shocks. Speciﬁcally, the endogenous discount factor decreases
with the aggregate consumption, which the representative entrepreneur takes as given.
In addition,   is set very small so that in the short run, the deviations of the endogenous
discount factor from the standard discount factor φβ are negligible (φ is the relative
































where PNt is the nominal price of the ﬁnal non-tradable good, Pt is the nominal price
of the ﬁnal tradable good, Wt is the price of aggregated labor, R∗ is the exogenous
return on dollar bonds, Rt is the return on peso bonds, fEjt and BEjt are dollar and
peso borrowing of the entrepreneurs, and TEjt is a government transfer. We rewrite













































Pt is the real exchange rate, bEjt ≡
bEjt
Pt is the real amount of peso bonds
and wt ≡
Wt
Pt is the real wage in terms of the tradable good.
Entrepreneurs also face a sequence of constraints given by retailers’ demand for












The ﬁrst-order conditions of the entrepreneurs’ problem, after imposing symmetry,
are presented in Appendix A.
Local workers-savers. Workers-savers supply labor to competitive employment











where i indexes workers-savers and θ is the elasticity of substitution between any two
types of diﬀerentiated labor. Worker i is a monopolistically competitive supplier of
its individual labor and sets the nominal wage Wit one period in advance. In period
t, worker sets his/her wage for the next period Wit+1, chooses tradable consumption
cT
Hit, non-tradable consumption cN
Hit, real dollar bond holdings fHit, nominal peso bond














+ ν ln(1 − LHit)
￿












Hk is an endogenous discount factor that depends on the aggre-






























Pt is the real amount of peso bonds. Workers-savers also face a sequence







The ﬁrst-order conditions of the workers-savers’ problem, after imposing symmetry,
are also in Appendix A.
The markets for the continuum of non-tradable intermediate goods and for the
continuum of diﬀerentiated labor inputs are summarized in Figure 1.
Fundamentals: We consider two distinct sources of uncertainty in the economy: real
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Entrepreneurs: yNj = AN ￿
LN
j





























∗ = Nominal rigidities
Figure 1: Production structure and nominal rigidities: Wi and PNj are set one period
in advance by workers and entrepreneurs, respectively.
shocks and nominal shocks. Real shocks are assumed to cause random ﬂuctuations in
the productivity of the tradable sector, while monetary shocks cause ﬂuctuations in
the money supply. We abstract from the role of ﬂuctuations in the productivity of the
non-tradable sector, as those are empirically less relevant than their tradable sector




t ) = ρT ln(A
T
t−1) + ǫTt, (3)
ln(Mt) = ρM ln(Mt−1) + ǫMt. (4)
where ρT and ρM are autoregressive coeﬃcients, and ǫT
t and ǫM
t are i.i.d. random
variables with variance σ2
T and σ2
M, respectively.
Foreign lenders: Foreign lenders are assumed to be small and risk-averse. This is
a crucial deviation from the literature. This assumption reﬂects the fact that due to
information barriers and other reasons, foreign investors can only invest in a few foreign
markets, and therefore are aﬀected by the investment’s performance in those markets.3
3For example, Didier, Rigobon, and Schmukler (2010) ﬁnds that U.S. equity mutual funds that
9They have a stochastic endowment of tradable goods in every period. Foreign lenders
have access to dollar and peso bond markets. In addition to the loan market of the
small country, foreign lenders can also borrow or lend in dollars to the rest of the world
at the exogenous rate R∗. Foreign lenders face a sequence of budget constraints





∗dFt−1 + yFt, (5)
where yt is endowment that follows an exogenous process:
ln(yFt) = ρy ln(yFt−1) + ǫyFt,
and fFt and bFt ≡
BFt
Pt are dollar and real peso loans from the foreign lenders to the
domestic country, dFt is the dollar loan to the rest of the world.












￿−µ is an endogenous discount factor that depends on the
aggregate level of foreign lenders’ consumption.






















Note that since R∗ will be set equal 1
β, (6) implies that in the steady state, cF = τ,
which we will set to a reasonable value.
Markets. Besides the markets for the continuum of non-tradable intermediate goods
and for the continuum of diﬀerentiated labor inputs, there are four markets in the
model. First, there is a market for the ﬁnal non-tradable good, where demand from














where we have used the symmetry of the non-tradable sector (LN
t = LN
jt for all j).
operate globally only invest in a surprisingly limited number of stock, around 100.
10Second, on the market for aggregated labor, entrepreneurs’ demand for the tradable






where we have used the symmetry of the household sector (Lt = Lit for all i). Third,
the net peso bond demand from local savers and entrepreneurs and foreign investors
equals to zeros
bHt + bEt + bFt = 0.
In other words, the demand for peso bonds (i.e. peso lending) stemming from domestic
and international lenders has to equal the supply of peso bonds (i.e. peso borrowing)
of the entrepreneurial sector.
Finally, there is the tradable goods market on which demand for tradable consump-
tion by workers and entrepreneurs has to match domestic tradable goods production
and imports from abroad (ﬁnanced via current account imbalances). Deﬁne the en-
trepreneurs’ and workers’ net worth as aEt ≡ fEt+bEt and aHt ≡ fHt+bHt, the tradable



















3 Solution of the model and a numerical exercise
3.1 Solving for the long-run currency choice
It is well-known that up to the ﬁrst-order approximation, the values of the portfolio
choices are indeterminate, because at this level of approximation, the two assets are
perfect substitutes. Previous literature usually relies on perfect market structures that
make portfolio choice irrelevant.
We log-linearize the model around the steady state and extend the method of
Devereux and Sutherland (2010) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) to solve for the
long run currency choices of workers, entrepreneurs and foreign lenders. Details are
presented in Appendix B.
In essence, workers, entrepreneurs and foreign lenders choose optimal levels of peso
loans to cross-insure, that is, the covariance between the diﬀerence in their consumption
and the peso-dollar bond return diﬀerential is zero. In the ﬁrst-order approximation,
11the conditions are the following:
Et[(ˆ r
B
t+1 − ˆ R
∗)(ˆ c
T
Ht+1 − ˆ c
T
Et+1)] = 0 (9)
Et[(ˆ r
B
t+1 − ˆ R
∗)(ˆ cFt+1 − ˆ c
T




Pt+1 is the real return of the peso bond next period.
3.2 Calibrations
In the numerical exercise, the values of the discount factor and the parameters for the
utility function β,R∗,γ,χ,ν are set as standard. We also choose reasonable values for
the parameters of the stochastic processes ρT,ρM,ρyF,σT,σM,σyF and ¯ M. Note that
we assume the money supply is more volatile than the technological process of the
tradable sector. The elasticities of substitution ω and θ are in line with the literature
(for example, see Chugh (2006)). We also set the endogenous discount factor coeﬃcient




4 since non-tradable production is less capital intensive. We set AT = 6 to obtain
a reasonable labor input (about 0.3 in the steady state). Then we choose AN and φ
to generate the levels of domestic lending and external debt to match those of Mexico
(the average percentages of private credit to GDP and of external debt to GDP for
Mexico in the last decade are both about 20%, according to the World Development
Indicators). For the foreign lenders, we choose τ = cF = 5, about twice the average
total consumption of the borrowing country (for the steady state values of entrepreneurs
and workers’ consumption, see table 2). We choose yyF = 5. The full set of parameters
is in Table 1.
3.2.1 Steady state
For the benchmark parameters above, the steady state values of the non-portfolio choice
variables are in Table 2.
In the steady state, total output of the country (in terms of the tradable good) is
3.7689 (units). Total lending from domestic savers to entrepreneurs in terms of the
tradable good is 0.9538, about 25.3% of total output. Total borrowing of domestic
entrepreneurs is 1.9338. The net asset of the country is then -0.9801, about 26% of
output. These ﬁgures match the averages of Mexico. Total labor supply is the sum of
labor supplies in both sectors, which is 0.2932. This makes the (real) wage bill equal
12β Discount factor 0.97
φ Entrepreneurs’ relative impatience coeﬃcient 0.99921
R∗ Dollar-bond interest rate 1
β
µ Endogenous discount factor coeﬃcient 0.001
γ Consumption component (utility) 1
3
χ Coeﬃcient of the Utility from Money 0.05
ν Coeﬃcient of the Utility from Leisure 2.27
η Share of capital in the tradable production 1
3
α Share of capital in the non-tradable production 1
4
AN TFP of the non-tradable production 5.35
AT TFP of the tradable production 6
ω Elasticity of input substitution for non-tradable production 10.5
θ Elasticity of labor substitution 21
ρT Persistence of the tradable productivity shocks 0.5
ρM Persistence of the monetary shocks 0.5
σT Standard deviation of the tradable productivity shocks 0.01
σM Standard deviation of the monetary shocks 0.04
¯ M Long run money supply 1
τ = cF Foreign consumption 5
yF Mean of foreigners’ other income 5
ρF Persistence of foreign income shocks 0.5
σyF Standard deviation of foreign income shocks 0.01
Table 1: Values of benchmark parameters
2.5423, about 67.45% of GDP. The rest is then the proﬁt of entrepreneurs. All of these
ﬁgures seem reasonable.
4 A special case: No foreign lenders
This section considers a special case of the model, in which we do not model explicitly
foreign lenders. Essentially, it means that the countries can borrow internationally
inelastically in dollars, at an exogenous world interest rate. In eﬀect, this is similar to
standard small open economy models. Domestic borrowers and lenders can borrow and
lend with each other in pesos and dollars, but international borrowing has to be done
in dollars. Without explicit consideration of foreign lenders, we will be able to examine
why local workers are willing to lend in pesos to entrepreneurs in the ﬁrst place. We
will show that productivity (i.e. real) shocks generate peso lending, and if monetary
shocks are more prevalent than productivity shocks, domestic ﬁnancial dollarization
can persist.
To solve for the optimal currency portfolios of domestic lenders and borrowers, we
follow the standard approach of Devereux and Sutherland (2010) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010)
13LN Labor in the Non-tradable production 0.1950
LT Labor in the Tradable production 0.0981
YN Non-tradable Output (units) 1.5701
YT Tradable Output (units) 1.2765
p Price of Non-tradable relative to Tradable 1.5874
YT + p ∗ YN Total Output in terms of tradable 3.7689
w Real wage 8.6721
CE
T Tradable consumption of Entrepreneurs (units) 0.3889
CH
T Tradable consumption of Workers (units) 0.8573
CE
T Non-Tradable consumption of Entrepreneurs (units) 0.4900
CH
N Non-Tradable consumption of Workers (units) 1.0801
aE Net asset position of Entrepreneurs -1.9338
aH Net asset position of Households 0.9538
aH Net asset position of the country -0.9801
Table 2: Steady State Values
to solve for the long run currency choices of workers-savers and entrepreneurs. Essen-
tially, the covariance between the diﬀerence in their consumption and the peso-dollar
bond return diﬀerential is zero, as equation (9) implies:
Et[(ˆ r
B
t+1 − ˆ R
∗)(ˆ c
T
Ht+1 − ˆ c
T
Et+1)] = 0
4.1 Zero peso loan
We start with the benchmark case in which no peso bond is allowed to trade in the
domestic market, i.e. all of the domestic lending and borrowing are done in dollars.
Essentially in this benchmark case, all lending and borrowing are done in dollars. This
is to completely isolate income ﬂuctuations from holding or issuing peso bonds. We will
examine the impacts of monetary and real shocks on agents’ income and consumption,
and then on the real return of a hypothetical peso bond. From that, we will assess if
holding or issuing peso bonds would provide a good hedge to the shocks.
First we consider the monetary shock. We consider a 1% decrease in the money
supply and pay particular attention to changes in tradable consumption4. Figure 5
in the appendix shows the impulse responses to the shock. For all the variables, the
y-axes represent percentage deviations from the steady state values. The ﬁrst reaction
is that both entrepreneurs and workers’ consumption decline, but the declines are very
small. The detailed responses are as follows: following the shock, the nominal price of
4Since the relative changes of non-tradable consumption are the same due to the Cobb-Douglas
aggregator (see equations A1 and A2 in the appendix), we just need to look at the changes in tradable
consumption
14the tradable good goes down, while the nominal price of the non-tradable good remains
unchanged due to nominal rigidity. This causes the real exchange rate- deﬁned as the
price of the non-tradable good divided by the price of the tradable good- to appreciate.
In the ﬁrst period, the real wage goes up because the nominal wage is sticky. After
the ﬁrst period, the real wage immediately goes back to the steady state level because
agents then can adjust the nominal wage. Entrepreneurs respond to the higher real
wage by employing less and producing lower output. Both income and consumption
of workers and entrepreneurs decline. The magnitude of the decline, however, is small:
the percentage changes of consumption are from 0.5×10−3 to 1.5×10−3 . On the other
hand, the decrease in the nominal price of the tradable good, which is eﬀectively the
increase in the real return of a hypothetical peso bond, is much larger: 6×10−2. This is
important. This implies that a small amount of peso bond lending would be suﬃcient
for workers and entrepreneurs to completely hedge against income ﬂuctuations caused
by monetary shocks.
Next we consider a 1% decrease in the productivity of the tradable production (Fig-
ure 6). We will see here that as opposed to the monetary shock, the magnitude of the
real shock’s impacts on income and consumption is similar to that of a hypothetical
peso bond’s return. This drives a larger need for domestic peso lending from domestic
workers-savers to entrepreneurs as an insurance mechanism. Speciﬁcally, the responses
of the economic variables are as follows: The decrease in tradable productivity shrinks
the production of the tradable good and raises its price, both in nominal and relative
terms: the real exchange rate depreciates. The production of the non-tradable good
does respond, but only very mildly compared to the reduction of the tradable produc-
tion. Both entrepreneurs and workers are worse oﬀ: their income and consumption
fall. Workers’ income decreases because their employment declines (in the tradable
sector), and their real wage falls. Entrepreneurs also suﬀer: their production, partic-
ularly tradable production, falls signiﬁcantly. They are more relatively worse oﬀ than
workers: their consumption drops more. The changes in consumption of workers and
entrepreneurs are about 6 × 10−2 (percentage).
On the other hand, a hypothetical peso bond would pay less because the price of
the tradable good goes up: the percentage change is about 6 × 10−2. We can see that
unlike the case of monetary shocks, the changes in consumption and in the return
of a hypothetical peso bond are of the same magnitude in response to real shocks.
There is therefore a need for a larger quantity of peso bond lending to hedge against
15income ﬂuctuations caused by real shocks. In particular, since peso bonds pay less
when entrepreneurs’s consumption drops more, issuing peso bonds can provide a very
good hedge for entrepreneurs to oﬀset the relative declines in income and consumption.
In other words, workers-savers who are less exposed to real shocks insure entrepreneurs
who are more so5.
From the two impulse responses, the main driving force that drives domestic lend-
ing in pesos is the productivity shocks to the tradable production. The reason is that
productivity shocks have larger impacts on real variables such as income and consump-
tion than nominal shocks do, which suggests a stronger role of peso bonds to insure
against real shocks. The monetary shocks play a negligible role, implying a higher level
of dollarized lending if monetary shocks are more prevalent. This is consistent with
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003).
4.2 Equilibrium case: Optimal peso loan
Next, we will examine the equilibrium case, in which workers and entrepreneurs are
allowed to borrow and lend in both dollars and pesos (international borrowing is still
restricted entirely in dollars). The optimal mix of dollar and peso loans will give the
agents perfect hedges against the shocks. That is, in the equilibrium, the covariance
between the entrepreneurs-households consumption diﬀerence and the dollar-peso bond
return diﬀerential is zero, as equation (9) indicates.
With our benchmark calibration, in the equilibrium, domestic savers lend 82.24%
of their total lending in pesos. The rest is in dollars. Now consider a 1% decrease
in productivity of tradable production (Figure 8 in the Appendix). Contrasting the
impulse responses between the benchmark case (i.e. a zero peso loan) and the equilib-
rium case, one can see a diﬀerence in the agents’ consumption. The gap in the change
of workers and entrepreneurs’ consumption is smaller now than that in the benchmark
case, suggesting an insurance role of peso bonds in play. That is, smaller (real) repay-
ments of peso-denominated bonds partly counteract entrepreneurs’ relative declines in
income and consumption in bad times.
Figure 8 indicates that peso bonds do not completely close the entrepreneurs-
workers consumption gap when real shock hits: entrepreneurs are still relatively worse
5This is the opposite to the ﬁnding in the implicit contract literature, in which risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs use implicit contracts to insure risk-averse workers against ﬂuctuations in their income.
A crucial diﬀerence in this paper is that both entrepreneurs and workers-savers are risk averse and
actively choose an optimal mix of dollar and peso bonds.
16oﬀ than workers when a positive real shock hits. Does this imply that the amount of
peso lending is still too little? In other words, why would entrepreneurs and workers
not borrow and lend more in pesos? The intuition is the following: Entrepreneurs do
not want to borrow more in pesos because they also desire to hedge against monetary
shocks. As Figure 7 shows, in the equilibrium, the amount of peso loan is already
too much to provide a perfect hedge against monetary shocks. As peso bonds pay
more in response to a negative monetary shock, additional peso borrowing would make
entrepreneurs’ consumption decline further in response to a negative money supply
shock. Therefore, the optimal peso loan in the equilibrium is the best compromised
hedge against the two types of shocks, although it is not perfect against any individual
one.
4.3 Monetary shocks v.s. Real shocks
In this section we investigate the relative importance of the monetary shocks and the
real shocks in the formation of the domestic currency choice. We will show that as in
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), if the real shocks are more prevalent, there will be more
peso lending; if the monetary shocks are more prevalent, there will be more dollar
lending between ﬁrms and households (i.e. a higher degree of ﬁnancial dollarization).
In our model, if we change both the absolute volatilities of the shocks, but keep the
relative volatility constant, the optimal amount peso loan would remain unchanged.
In other words, absolute volatility does not matter. We will show that the relative
volatility of the real shocks and the monetary shocks determines the optimal amount
of the domestic peso loan.
It is probably already clear from the impulse exercises in sections 4.1 and 4.2 why
real shocks generate more peso lending and reduce domestic ﬁnancial dollarization.
The reason is very simple: real shocks generate relatively larger impacts on income
and consumption compared to impacts on peso bonds’ return than monetary shocks
do. Hence a larger amount of peso lending is required to hedge against income and
consumption ﬂuctuations caused by real shocks.
In the exercise, we keep the standard deviation of the real shocks at the benchmark
value (0.01), and change the standard deviation of the nominal shocks from 0.001 to
0.1. Note that the standard deviations of the shocks only aﬀect the long run optimal
currency choice, they do not aﬀect the steady state values of other variables.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding optimal peso loan. When the real shocks are

















































Figure 2: Optimal Peso loans, for diﬀerent volatility of the monetary shocks
more volatile relative to the monetary shocks, the need for peso loans is high. As
explained above, workers who are less exposed to the real shocks insure entrepreneurs
who are more so. When the volatility of the monetary shocks is high relative to that of
the real shocks, the optimal peso loan is smaller. In that case, the main concern of ﬁrms
and households is monetary shocks, and a small amount of peso lending is suﬃcient to
hedge against the shocks. Much of the lending between ﬁrms and households therefore
is done in dollars. The result implies that chronical ﬁnancial dollarization can persist
even if inﬂation has been controlled. What matters is the relative volatility of inﬂation
(monetary shocks) compared to that of productivity (real shocks). If the volatility of
productivity happens to dampen down along with the decline of inﬂation shocks, the
need for peso bonds continues to be weak.
5 The full model with foreign lenders
The previous section shows why domestic workers-savers lend in pesos to entrepreneurs:
domestic workers-savers insure entrepreneurs against relative income and consumption
ﬂuctuations caused by the real shocks. This section considers the full-ﬂedged model
where we also include small, risk-averse foreign lenders who can lend/borrow in both
dollars and pesos. In eﬀect, all agents: entrepreneurs, domestic workers-savers and
18foreign lenders can lend and borrow in both pesos and dollars. We will examine why
domestic savers may aﬀord a lower premium for peso bonds than foreign lenders can.
5.1 Zero peso loan
To understand the demand for peso bonds, we consider the impulse responses in the
case of no peso loans. This is to isolate the impact of the shocks on agents’ income
and consumption from the return of peso loans. Subsequently, we will determine if a
hypothetical peso bond could provide a good hedge against the income shocks. This
scenario is similar to the one in section 4.1, except now we also examine the responses
of foreign lenders, who are small and risk-averse.
First, we consider a 1% decrease in tradable productivity only, and focus on the
relative consumption responses of domestic savers and foreign lenders. Notice that the
y-axes represent percentage deviation from the steady state values, with one exception.
The y-axis of the country’s total borrowing (the upper right panel) represents absolute
deviation from the steady state value (which is -0.9909). Figure 9 in the appendix
shows the impulse responses to the shock. Domestic workers-savers’ income goes down
due to the lower employment and lower real wages, and that has an impact on their
consumption. Income and consumption of domestic entrepreneurs also decline because
of lower tradable production. Foreign lenders’ income, however, does not change,
since their endowment does not change and the dollar bonds’ return is pre-determined.
Additional borrowing (in dollars) from the country is accommodated by foreigners’
additional borrowing from other sources (also in dollars). For those reasons, foreign
lenders’ consumption does not change.
The decline in tradable productivity on the other hand leads to an increase in
the nominal price of the tradable good and a depreciation of the peso. With the
depreciation, the return of a hypothetical peso bond would decline. Hence foreign
lenders have incentives to oﬀer peso loans, with a premium, to domestic agents to
insure them against the real shock, because peso bonds pay less in bad times. This is
the standard argument in the literature about why a country should borrow abroad
in its domestic currency, if foreign lenders’ income from other sources is orthogonal to
the country’s business cycle.6
6An additional assumption in the literature is that foreign lenders are large and risk-neutral, hence
they have incentives to insure risk-averse domestic borrowers. In this paper, we make a crucial
departing assumption that foreign lenders are small and also risk-averse.
19If foreign lenders’ income from other sources is more correlated to the country’s
business cycle, foreign lenders’ incentive to hold peso-bonds declines. And if the “con-
sumption basket” eﬀect is large enough, domestic lenders can be more willing to hold
peso bonds than foreign lenders. We can see this in the next exercise of impulse re-
sponses: we consider a 1% decrease in foreign lenders’ endowment and a 1% decrease
in domestic productivity shock at the same time. This is to illustrate the extreme case
when the domestic economy is perfectly correlated to the world’s business cycle. As
we can see from ﬁgure 10, foreign lenders’ consumption also falls signiﬁcantly, indicat-
ing that peso lending would now be much less desirable for foreign lenders. Domestic
savers may aﬀord a lower peso premium than foreign lenders because they have a more
favorable consumption basket: they consume mostly peso-denominated goods whose
prices typically adjust slowly to shocks.
5.2 Optimal peso loan
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Long−run share of pesos in foreign lending
Long−run share of pesos in domestic lending
Figure 3: Shares of peso lending when the consumption basket has less non-tradable
goods
In this section, we examine the equilibrium case for the full model, in which en-
trepreneurs, workers and foreign lenders can lend and borrow in pesos. We pay particu-
lar attention to the correlation between foreign endowment and the country’s tradable
productivity. Figure 3 below shows the long run peso shares when the correlation
20changes. When the correlation is low (i.e. the country’s business cycle is more in-
dependent to the world’s), most of the peso lending is done by foreign lenders and
they eﬀectively insure the country. When the correlation is high however, the role of
local savers’ more favorable consumption basket becomes more dominant: local savers
increasingly take on peso lending to domestic ﬁrms. When the correlation is larger
than 0.75, foreign lenders no longer lend in pesos. Rather, in our numerical exercise,
they borrow pesos from domestic savers. Domestic savers lend pesos to both domestic
entrepreneurs and foreigners.
A simple numerical exercise indicates that favorable consumption baskets for do-
mestic savers can go a long way in explaining international debt dollarization, without
having to resort to market frictions.
When the consumption basket is more tilted toward non-tradable goods and less
toward tradable goods, we should expect peso lending shifts even more to domestic
savers. In the following exercise, we increase α from the benchmark value of 1/4 to
0.27, to make the non-tradable production less productive at each unit of labor input.
As a result, in the steady state, the relative share of non-tradable output (compared to
tradable output) is smaller than the benchmark case. Figure 4 below shows that now to
induce foreign lenders stop lending in pesos, the correlation between foreign endowment
and the country’s tradable productivity has to be larger than 0.8, as opposed to 0.75
in the benchmark case.
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Figure 4: Shares of peso lending when the consumption basket has less non-tradable
goods
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a new explanation of why developing countries may appear to
be unable to borrow much internationally in their domestic currency. We argue that
countries might not need to, as entrepreneurs can borrow in the domestic currency from
domestic savers at a lower premium than they could from foreign lenders. Local savers
might accept a lower risk premium than foreign lenders on local currency bonds because
a large part of their consumption basket consists of non-tradable goods whose nominal
prices typically adjust slowly to shocks. Therefore in downturn, a peso depreciation is
less damaging to domestic peso bond holders than to foreign ones, whose consumption
baskets are entirely in dollars.
We developed a simple DSGE model to provide a quantitative evaluation of the
mechanism. The model features three agents (domestic workers-savers, entrepreneurs,
and foreign lenders), two sectors (tradable and non-tradable goods) with sticky prices
and wages and endogenous currency choice. We show that the relative willingness
of local and foreign lenders to hold peso-bonds depends on the relative size of the
non-tradable sector, and on the degree of synchronization between a country’s busi-
ness cycle and the global economic conditions. Our results indicate that diﬀerential
consumption baskets can go a long way to explaining international debt dollarization,
22without having to resort to market frictions. For example, in our numerical exercise,
when the correlation between tradable productivity and foreign endowment is larger
than 0.75, foreign lenders no longer lend in pesos. They ﬁnd it optimal to lend entirely
in dollars, or even borrow in pesos.
An extension of the model, which incorporates investment and an empirical test for
the main results in this paper, is left for further research.
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Equation (A1) is a static optimality condition describing the composition of the
entrepreneur’s consumption basket between tradable and non-tradable goods. Equa-
tions (A2), (A3) and (A4) are Euler equations for dollar bonds, peso bonds and money
holdings. Equation (A5) is a labor demand equation, and (A6) is an optimal price
setting condition.




























































As for entrepreneurs, equation (A7) is a static optimality condition describing the
composition of the household’s consumption basket between tradable and non-tradable
goods. Equations (A8), (A9) and (A10) are Euler equations for dollar bonds, peso
bonds and money holdings. Equation (A11) is an optimal wage setting condition.
B Appendix B: Solving for portfolio choices of en-
trepreneurs, workers and foreign lenders
This appendix presents the solution for the zero-order portfolio choices in the case where
households and entrepreneurs trade both dollar bonds and peso bonds with foreign
investors, and where we make the assumption that the foreign lenders are small and risk
averse. Deﬁne the entrepreneurs’ and households’ real holdings of peso bonds as bEt ≡
BEt/Pt, bHt ≡ BHt/Pt and bFt ≡ BFt/Pt and their net worth as aEt ≡ fEt +bEt, aHt ≡
fHt+bHt and aFt ≡ fFt+bFt. The only equilibrium conditions of the model where these
peso bond and net worth positions show up are the entrepreneurs’ budget constraint,




Et + pNt + c
N























7The households’ budget constraint can be obtained by combining these constraints.
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Denote the ﬁrst-order components of the excess return of the portfolio of en-
trepreneurs and households as ǫE
t ≡ bER( ˆ Pt−1 − ˆ Pt + ˆ Rt − ˆ R∗
t) and ǫH
t ≡ bHR( ˆ Pt−1 −
ˆ Pt + ˆ Rt − ˆ R∗
t). Following the approach of Devereux and Sutherland, we initially con-
sider ǫE
t and ǫH
t to be exogenous i.i.d. random variables. The ﬁrst-order approx-
imations of the terms (Rt
Pt−1
Pt − R∗
t)bEt−1 in (B1), (Rt
Pt−1
Pt − R∗






(bEt−1 + bHt−1) in (B3) are expressed by ǫE
t ,−(ǫE
t + ǫH




From this we can solve for the ﬁrst order approximation of the model, with ǫE
t and
ǫF
t as the two iid state variables. Rearranging terms gives us the ﬁrst-order accurate
solution for the excess return on peso bonds:








t+1 + θrεt+1 (B.4)
where εt+1=[ǫTt+1 ǫMt+1] is a vector of real and nominal shocks. Consumption diﬀer-
ences between foreign lenders and entrepreneurs, and households and entrepreneurs,
respectively are:










t+1 + θFEεt+1 + ˜ θFEˆ xt (B.5)
ˆ c
T










t+1 + θHEεt+1 + ˜ θHEˆ xt (B.6)
where ˆ xt is a vector of endogenous state variables.
Recognizing that ǫH
t+1 = bHRˆ rxt+1 and ǫE


















r bHR − θE
r bER
+ θFEεt+1 + ˜ θFEˆ xt (B.8)









r bHR − θE
r bER
+ θHEεt+1 + ˜ θHEˆ xt (B.9)
The idea is substitute (B8) and (B9) into second-order approximations of the Euler
equations of workers, entrepreneurs and foreign lenders:
Et[(ˆ cFt+1 − ˆ c
T
Et+1)ˆ rxt+1] = 0 (B.10)
Et[(ˆ c
T
Ht+1 − ˆ c
T
Et+1)ˆ rxt+1] = 0 (B.11)




























r = 0 (B.13)
where Σ = Etεt+1ε′
t+1.
From the two equations above, we can derive bE and bF,as follows:
First, denote a1 ≡ R(θH
FEθr−θH
r θFE)Σθ′
r, a2 ≡ R(θE
FEθr−θE
r θFE)Σθ′
r, a3 ≡ θFEΣθ′
r;
and d1 ≡ R(θH
HEθr − θH
r θHE)Σθ′
r, d2 ≡ R(θE
HEθr − θE
r θHE)Σθ′
r, d3 ≡ θHEΣθ′
r.
(B12) and (B13) become:
a1bH + a2bE + a3 = 0 (B.14)









and bF = −(bE + bH)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a 1% decreases in Productivity and Foreign Endow-
ment, Zero peso loan
30